There is widespread interest in measuring risk attitudes and incorporating such measures into broader econometric analyses. We consider three elicitation procedures currently in use. We find considerable variability within -and even more, between -the results they produce. We suggest that this reflects the way that different instruments interact with imprecise underlying preferences. The short-run implication is that such procedures need to be used with caution and are likely to be highly context-specific. The longer run implication is that adding 'white noise' to deterministic models is inadequate: we need to develop models that allow for imprecision and procedural variation.
A number of recent studies into decision-making under risk and over time have used various instruments to measure individual risk attitudes and discount rates. The idea is that such measures could be used to help explain and predict other decisions (such as choice of investment, insurance policy, pension scheme). This study investigates the within and between-procedural robustness of three such instruments when used to elicit risk attitudes. We find degrees of variability and disparity that are difficult to explain within the terms of any deterministic model, although it may be easier to understand at least some of the diversity and discrepancies if we allow that preferences are imprecise and that responses may, at least in part, be shaped by the procedures used to elicit.
The three procedures which are the focus of this article will be referred to as the choice list procedure, the ranking procedure and the allocation procedure. We shall describe each in detail in the course of the article, but the essence of each is as follows.
The choice list (sometimes called multiple price list) method presents a table of binary choices designed so that as a respondent works through the table, he can be expected to switch at some point from one 'side' to the other. When the choices are between risky alternatives, the switching point is assumed to be indicative of the individual's risk attitude.
The ranking procedure presents a set of options and asks the respondent to identify which option he ranks top. When applied to a set of risky prospects that have different combinations of spread and return, the idea is to identify the individual's risk attitude as reflected in his most preferred balance between mean and variance.
The allocation procedure provides the respondent with a budget and allows him to distribute it between different state-contingent claims. When applied to risk, the chosen allocation, in conjunction with information about the rate of exchange between claims, should allow the individual's risk attitude to be inferred.
The data generated by any of the above procedures are normally interpreted with respect to expected utility theory (EUT) or some other deterministic theory, with the analysis allowing for some form of 'white noise' in people's responses. One needs to allow for within-person variability because, ever since the earliest experiments tried to elicit individuals' preferences, it has been known that if we present an individual with some set of decision tasks and repeat each question at several points within the same experimental session, 1 we are likely to observe that individual giving a different answer to exactly the same question on at least some occasions: see Mosteller and Nogee (1951) , for an early example; a number of more recent studies are discussed in Bardsley et al. (2009, Chapter 7) . So it has become standard practice to analyse responses on the basis that if an individual behaves according to theory X, his/her true preferences are given by some deterministic 'core' parameters, with any particular observation liable to diverge from the true preference due to some random noise, with the choice of error specification often being a matter of convention and convenience.
Such an approach raises two issues. One -which we note, but which is not the focus of this article -is that different assumptions about the error term may produce quite different conclusions about the performance of different core theories -see Stott (2006) and Blavatskyy and Pogrebna (2010) for examples. The second issue, which is the motivation for this article, is that the 'deterministic-core-plus-white-noise' formulation may be inappropriate and inadequate.
If the standard formulation were a reasonably good assumption, we should expect that responses to different questions within the same procedure should all be consistent with approximately the same core model and whatever risk attitude it entails, and that different procedures should yield much the same picture for any particular individual.
However, there is a substantial and wide-ranging body of evidence that casts doubt on such suppositions. In particular, there are many manifestations of 'framing' effects and failures of procedural invariance such that when ostensibly the same choice or decision task is presented in different formats or using different procedures, response patterns are systematically different. Kahneman and Tversky (2000) provide a collection of studies of such phenomena, which are robust to replication.
One possible way of explaining both within-person variability and systematic between-procedure differences is to model responses to decision tasks not simply as the direct revelation of fully formed 'true' preferences plus exogenous white noise but more as the result of some deliberative process whereby an individual draws on a substratum of possible values and preferences to construct a response.
Such an explanation is in the spirit of Simon's (1978) invocation to economists to develop models of procedural rationality by borrowing from neighbouring disciplines, which have studied decision-making processes. For example, there is a body of psychological and neuroscientific literature, which models decisions as being arrived at after some neural 'accumulator' or 'sequential sampling' process (for a survey, see Otter et al., 2008;  for an early and influential example applied to risky choice, see Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993) . Instead of assuming, as deterministic models do, that an individual comes to a decision with a single precise set of subjective values, accumulator models suppose that it is as if past experiences have laid down distributions of such values. The process of reaching a decision is then modelled as if an individual samples repeatedly from these underlying distributions, building up subjective arguments for and against different options, with this mental sampling continuing until the balance of subjective feelings in favour of one option or another tips the individual to make a decision.
Models of this kind have several implications. First, they can accommodate the stochastic nature of decisions. It is easy to imagine cases where the relative advantages and disadvantages of competing options are such that the sampling process sometimes produces a balance in favour of one option and sometimes tips the balance in favour of another, even when the options have been presented in exactly the same way. Such models can thereby provide an account of the variability of decisions when the same task is presented in exactly the same way on different occasions.
Second, such models can explain why an individual may take different amounts of time to process different decisions within the same format. For example, in binary choices where the alternatives are quite evenly balanced, it may require more sampling (i.e. take longer) to reach a decision and the probabilities of each being chosen may be in the vicinity of 0.5; whereas if one option is then improved relative to the other, it will be likely to be chosen more often and less time will be required to make that decision. Such a relationship between response times and choice probabilities is well established ( Jamieson and Petrusic, 1977; Moffatt, 2005) but it cannot easily be explained by a standard 'deterministic-core-plus-white-noise model'.
Third, such models may help explain people's ability to recognise -up to a point, at least -their own uncertainty about their preferences. For example, Butler and Loomes (2007) asked individuals to respond to a series of binary choices where one option was held constant and the other was progressively changed. Every time the variable option changed, participants were asked to state which option they chose and whether they definitely preferred it or thought they preferred it but were not sure. From the perspective of standard deterministic models, it is hard to know what sense to make of such responses. Yet, most participants found the question meaningful and were able to report 'imprecision intervals' where they were less than completely sure about their preferences. This is consistent with an accumulator process where the individual terminates sampling before he is completely confident about his decision.
Fourth, uncertainty about their preferences may make people susceptible to various procedural or contextual influences. Indeed, Butler and Loomes (2007) found that both ends of the reported imprecision intervals, as well as the point of switching between the two options, were liable to be influenced by various features of the procedure that standard economic models would regard as theoretically irrelevant. 2 However, it seems quite possible that the nature and framing of the decision task could systematically influence the sampling process and hence affect the patterns of response that result.
But how much do the possibilities outlined above really matter when it comes to eliciting measures of risk attitude? The answer depends on whether any interactions between the different procedures and people's deliberative processes result in systematic effects that are strong enough to undermine the generality and transferability of the measures we elicit. If the effects exist but are small and are counterbalanced by a number of other effects that offset or submerge them, we might operate on the basis that the combination of such effects can be adequately approximated by some standard error specification. On the other hand, if the effects are powerful and highly context-dependent, we might want to be more cautious about supposing transferability from one context to another and we might put greater research effort into trying to develop procedural models which can accommodate such data.
To investigate these issues, we conducted an experiment designed to provide data about the amount of within-procedure variability and also about the extent of consistency or inconsistency among the three procedures under examination. To this end, we recruited 423 students from the University of Warwick who completed a set of 20 decision tasks which, between them, involved examples of all three procedures. Detailed information about the experiment and its implementation can be found online 3 and in the online Appendix, but the key features will be described more fully when each procedure is discussed in the relevant sections below.
Our results add considerably to the available evidence about the extent to which elicited measures of risk attitude, as conventionally defined, depend upon and vary with the particular questions asked within a given procedure. The results also suggest that even after allowing for within-procedure variability, there is substantial evidence that different procedures produce different patterns of response that are difficult -we think, impossible -to reconcile with a 'deterministic-core-plus-whitenoise' approach.
The article is structured as follows. In Sections 1, 2 and 3, we describe the experimental design relating to each elicitation procedure and discuss what the data may tell us about the extent to which we can rely on that particular procedure to deliver reasonably consistent measures of risk attitudes. 4 For all three procedures, the experimental payoffs are sums of money contingent on the realisation of single-stage random mechanisms where the likelihoods are clearly specified in a format comparable across procedures. Having looked at each procedure separately, Section 4 makes comparisons between them and discusses the nature and extent of the systematic differences we find. In Section 5, we consider implications which our results might have for future applications and directions of research.
1. The Choice List Procedure
Motivation
This procedure presents respondents with a table or list, which constitutes an ordered series of pairs of options constructed in such a way that the point where an individual switches from one side of the table to the other is taken to identify a range within which the individual's point of indifference is located and from which a measure of the individual's risk attitude can be derived.
The choice list task has been used by many researchers for one purpose or another. An early example can be found in Cohen et al. (1987) : they presented a particular lottery -e.g. a 0.25 chance of receiving 1,000 French Francs (FF) -and asked participants to consider a series of sure alternatives with increments of 50FF between them, to identify certainty equivalents. Tversky and Kahneman (1992, pp. 305-306) used a similar procedure in two stages, with the first stage offering seven widely spaced sure amounts against a given lottery and the second stage offering more finely gradated sums in the region where the first-stage switch had occurred. More recently, Holt and Laury (2002) constructed tables where there were two-outcome lotteries on both sides of the table and where all payoffs were held constant while the probabilities were changed progressively in such a way that the preference could be expected to switch between one end of the table and the other. Such lists -or variants of them -have become popular in many studies since then.
In a world of reasonably robust deterministic preferences, this instrument could be expected to work quite well: if core preferences are consistent with EUT and if deviations in the form of switching a little too early or a little too late are due simply to white noise, two or three such choice lists should be sufficient to provide decent estimates of risk attitudes at the individual level and a good picture of the distribution of such measures in any sample.
However, there are two reasons for being cautious about operating on that basis: first, the doubt that EUT is the appropriate core model; and second, the imprecision of people's responses to such tasks and their vulnerability to procedural effects.
On the first issue, Cohen et al. (1987, p. 10) note that when choice lists are used to elicit certainty equivalents for a variety of lotteries, 'the instability of risk attitudes is striking'. Tversky and Kahneman (1992, Tables 3 and 4) provide similar evidence of how median responses vary from risk averse to risk seeking as the nature of the lotteries changes. Of course, such evidence does not by itself refute the 'deterministic-core-plus-white-noise' formulation: indeed, both sets of authors interpret their results as demonstrating the inadequacy of EUT as the core theory, proposing instead that some form of Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) provides a better core model, to which a conventional error term might well be added. An important lesson to be learnt from these studies, however, is that taking just one or two choice list tables as a basis for eliciting measures of risk attitude and then extrapolating those measures to other choices is an unsafe way of proceeding. Notwithstanding such evidence, it has become common practice to rely on just one or two tables interpreted on the basis of EUT as the core theory.
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On the second issue, there is some evidence of imprecision in responses to choice lists. Cohen et al. (1987) provided the opportunity for respondents to identify values where they either considered the alternatives to be equivalent or else where they did not know which alternative they preferred (in which case, they let the experimenter make the choice for them). If an individual identified at least two adjacent values in any one list, Cohen et al. registered a positive 'indecision interval'. With increments of 50FF, they found up to 10% of respondents reporting such indecision. Dubourg et al. (1997) used lists to elicit willingness to pay for safety improvements, asking respondents to identify the largest amounts they felt sure they would be prepared to pay (call this WTP min ), the smallest amounts they were certain they would not pay (WTP max ) and, if those two amounts differed, the sum that they felt would make it hardest to decide whether to pay or not. They not only found substantial intervals between WTP max and WTP min but also noted that the size and position of those intervals were systematically affected by the ranges of values presented in the lists, sometimes to the extent that the average WTP min elicited via a list with a larger range was higher than the average WTP max elicited via a list with a smaller range.
More recently, Cubitt et al. (2013) elicited certainty equivalents and associated imprecision intervals using lists that were rather more fine-grained than those in Cohen et al. (1987) and they found imprecision to be pervasive, with an average of 87% of respondents identifying at least some interval. They did not test for the kinds of range effects reported by Dubourg et al. (1997) but they established the existence and persistence of imprecision across a broad range of lotteries of the kind widely used in incentivised experiments.
Of course, the fact that imprecision can be identified in choice list tasks does not necessarily mean that they are vulnerable to procedural effects. But L evy-Garboua et al. (2012) considered several different variations of the Holt and Laury (2002) procedure and found that different ways of presenting the tables produce different patterns of risk attitudes and different degrees of internal inconsistency. So we set out to examine both the variability of estimated risk attitudes across different parameter sets and also the susceptibility of responses to a basic consistency test: namely, whether simply inverting the list makes any systematic difference to the distributions we infer. 6 5 For a recent example, see Brown and Kim (2014) . In the manner of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) , they use a two-step (coarser-finer) procedure but rely entirely on just one set of payoffs along the lines of Holt and Laury (2002) and assume EUT with constant relative risk aversion. Despite citing Cohen et al. (1987) as an early example of the choice list procedure, they make no reference to the concerns raised there about the use of EUT and the instability of EUT-based measures of risk attitude. No reference is made to Tversky and Kahneman (1992) . 6 By keeping the range of the table the same and also keeping all of the increments between rows the same and as uniformly spread as possible, we control for any 'range-frequency' effects of the kind identified in many experiments since Parducci (1965).
Design
We constructed five different lists, each constituting a separate decision task (DT), varying the parameters of the choices in ways we shall explain shortly. We randomised our sample of participants so that about half saw the lists of choices ordered in one way -version 1 (V1) -while the other half (V2) saw exactly the same sets of choices, but presented 'upside down'. 7 Figure 1 shows how a list was presented. Here, we show the final DT in the experiment, varying the lotteries on both sides in the style used by Holt and Laury (2002) . Our display was intended to make it easy for participants to see what the lotteries involved, how they compared with each other and how they changed from one row to the next. For the first two rows, the left-hand option offers the higher expected value (EV), while for the other eight rows, the right-hand option offers the higher EV, with the difference between EVs increasing as we go down the list. Thus, if someone chooses the right-hand option throughout, or else switches from left to right after the first row, he may be regarded as risk seeking. If he switches between the second row and third row, he may be judged approximately risk neutral. Switching below the third row is taken to signify risk aversion, with lower switching points indicating greater risk aversion.
Besides the DT shown in Figure 1 , there were four other choice list tasks. Two of these were 'certainty equivalent' tasks where a particular lottery was held constant on one side and on the other side, the option of a sure sum of money was varied -in our cases, from £1 to £10 inclusive by £1 increments. For DT16, the fixed lottery offered a 0.6 chance of £10 and a 0.4 chance of 0; while for DT18, the fixed lottery gave a 0.2 chance of £18 and a 0.8 chance of £3.
The other two tasks took a 'lottery equivalent' form. In these cases, the sure sums of money on one side were held constant while on the other side, a lottery offered two payoffs with the probabilities of the higher payoff varying by increments of 0.1 while the probability of the lower payoff reduced accordingly. For DT17, the sure amount was fixed at £8, with the alternative offering £18 with probability p and £3 with probability 1-p; while for DT19, all payoffs were £3 lower -that is, the fixed certainty of £5 was juxtaposed to (£15, p; 0, 1-p).
The incentive mechanism was straightforward: if a choice list question were selected to be the basis for payment, one row of the list would be picked at random and the participant would be given the option he had chosen from that pair and be paid according to how that option played out.
One feature of our experimental design worth bearing in mind when considering the results is that, within each procedure, participants were asked to answer all tasks of that kind and were then invited to review any earlier responses and make any adjustments they wished before confirming their complete set of answers to all DTs of the same kind. This was intended to give participants every opportunity to make their responses cohere in any respect they thought fit (but on the understanding that only one task from the experiment as a whole would form the basis of their payment for taking part).
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Decision 20
In this decision, we ask you to choose between two uncertain options X and Y. If this decision is chosen for payment, we will select one of the choices below and look up your preferred option (X or Y). Then you will draw one ball either from the bag with black and white balls or from the bag with yellow and brown balls.
You will receive £8 if you draw a black ball and £5 if you draw a white ball.
You will receive £20 if you draw a yellow ball and £1 if you draw a brown ball.
All payoffs displayed below are in pound sterling Uncertain option X Uncertain option Y Fig. 1 . An Example of a Decision Task Display in the Choice List Procedure
Results for the Choice List Procedure 9 Table 1 reports the distributions of responses for each of the five DTs from the choice list procedure, categorising individuals by the number of times they chose the sure or safer option in each list 10 and distinguishing between V1 and V2. So the observations in the upper rows are those individuals exhibiting the most risk-seeking behaviour and lower rows represent progressively greater risk aversion. The average number of sure/ safer choices is shown at the bottom of each column. To provide a benchmark, the rows where a risk-neutral individual could be found are indicated by the # symbol. Table 1 shows that the distributions of responses were indeed liable to be affected by something as seemingly arbitrary as which way up the choice lists were displayed. There is no particular effect for DT17 or DT19 but, for DT16, DT18 and DT20, the differences are significant: in all three cases, Mann-Whitney tests reject the null hypothesis of no difference between the distributions at p < 0.01.
The contrasts between DT16 and DT18 are of particular interest, as each task involves a lottery with an EV of £6 being compared with sure sums ranging from £1 to £10 inclusive. Risk aversion might suggest that we should expect more safe choices when the lottery has higher variance, as in DT18, and this seems to be the case for V1 (p < 0.05); but turning the lists upside down reverses the difference, producing a significant tendency (p < 0.01) for V2 respondents to choose the sure option less often in DT18 than in DT16.
11 If responses can be shifted significantly by which way up a list is presented, we might want to be cautious about the extent to which precise numerical estimates of risk attitude parameters can be derived from just one or two list tasks and can then be used to 'control' for risk when analysing data generated in some rather different context.
We deliberately use very general tests not requiring any particular functional form. Often, the responses to such choice lists are used in conjunction with some specific assumption about functional form -e.g. EUT with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) -to generate midpoint estimates of risk attitude parameters. However, if such an exercise produces discrepancies, it is open to the objection that the wrong specification may have been chosen. To avoid this possible complication, we shall (in this and subsequent sections) ask instead how far each individual's response to one DT correlates with his or her response to a different DT relative to other members of the same sample who were shown the list displayed in the same format. 9 The results in this subsection and throughout the rest of the main text of this article are based on 351 individuals out of a total of 423 who provided responses to the full set of tasks. In online Appendix B, we outline the criteria we used to exclude a participant's responses. Our criteria were quite demanding because we wanted to be able to reassure readers of this article that none of the main conclusions could be driven by a number of outlier responses given by people who might not understand properly what they were being asked to do. Online Appendix C reports the analysis for the full sample of 423 individuals and shows that none of the conclusions is significantly altered. Furthermore, in online Appendix D, we present an example of our analysis for a particular functional form of EUT with CRRA and show that our results remain robust when we assume a particular functional form. 10 The option that was the riskier lottery in nine rows might offer its high payoff with certainty in the tenth row, thereby dominating the sure/safer option in this case with a higher sure amount -but here this is counted as the choice of the riskier option.
11 The test conducted in these last two cases involves taking, for each individual, the difference between the number of times he/she chooses the sure option in each list and testing the null hypothesis that this difference is on average zero.
If 'attitude to risk' is an individual-level characteristic, we might expect (at least within a particular kind of elicitation procedure) that those individuals who exhibit more (less) risk aversion than others in one DT would also be likely to exhibit more (less) risk aversion than those same other people in a different DT of the same kind. We examine this hypothesis in the context of the five choice lists by ranking individuals according to their switching points within each list, supposing that if individual X is more risk averse than individual Y, X will tend to switch at lower points in Table 1 than Y.  Tables 2 and 3 show the rank correlation coefficients for each pair of tasks within each version of the experiment. In most comparisons, the correlations are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, which suggests that there is some broad case for thinking of some people as more or less risk averse than others. However, the coefficients vary a good deal: they are highest for the two lists we might regard as most similar -DT17 and DT19, where DT17 is the same as DT19 except with £3 added to each payoff -but are often quite low for other pairs where there are more differences: for example, between DT16 (where a lottery with a possibility of a zero payoff stays fixed while the alternative sure amounts vary) and DT17 (where the sure amount is fixed, while the alternative lotteries vary the probabilities of two strictly positive payoffs).
If a method of obtaining measures of risk attitude is to be given much credence, one might expect it to do better in ranking individuals consistently within the narrow domain of lotteries each involving no more than two payoffs.
This conclusion might seem rather more pessimistic than the one reached by Andersen et al. (2008, p. 591) . In their study, they asked each participant to respond to four choice list tasks and declared themselves content to use these responses as the basis for estimating CRRA coefficients. However, all four of their lists shared the Holt Notes. The # symbol denotes individuals whose responses could be consistent with risk neutrality. 'Average' refers to the average number of sure/safer choices before switching.
and Laury (2002) format with payoffs not varying greatly across the lists, so it would not be too surprising if they found enough consistency over that range to satisfy themselves. Andersen et al. (2008) did not explore how well their estimates extended to other structures within the choice list format, as we did; nor did they examine their transferability to other kinds of tasks. This is an issue to which we now turn.
The Ranking Procedure
Design and Motivation
Our ranking task is a variant of a procedure used in Binswanger (1980 Binswanger ( , 1981 and further developed by Eckel and Grossman (2002) who used a multiple choice task where each participant was asked to select the most preferred lottery out of a set of five 50-50 lotteries with different payoffs and EVs. These lotteries were shown as rows in a table, with the top row offering a sure amount and subsequent lotteries keeping the probabilities fixed while progressively increasing the EV and the spread of the payoffs. Those respondents who were most risk averse could opt for the certainty, but less riskaverse individuals were expected to prefer lotteries lower down the table, with the least risk-averse (and all risk-neutral and risk-seeking) individuals opting for the lottery in the bottom row, which offered the highest EV. We modified the Eckel and Grossman (2002) method in two ways. First, we increased the number of lotteries in the table from five to six so that there was no longer a 'middle' item and there was room for finer differentiation of attitudes. Second, instead of asking participants just to select one lottery out of six, we asked them to rank all lotteries from the most preferred (rank 1) to the least preferred (rank 6). This allowed us not only to do what Eckel and Grossman (2002) did (by looking at the top choices) but also to see how far individuals' responses look consistent with the 'singlepeakedness' property often assumed in the modelling of preferences. 12 By asking each participant to undertake the task for two different sets of six lotteries, we aimed to explore how sensitive responses were to changes in the parameters.
To encourage respondents to think carefully about the whole ranking, they were told that if one of the questions were selected to be the basis for payment, two of the six options would be picked at random and the participant would be given whichever of those two options they had ranked higher and be paid according to how that option played out.
In a deterministic world, ranking tasks are extensions of binary preferences (so long as transitivity holds) and the order in which the options are processed should make no difference to the final result. However, if preferences are imprecise, the order in which the options are processed or the range of the options or the intervals between each alternative may affect the final ranking.
The first of the ranking DTs was the same for every participant. It is shown in Figure 2 below.
In each of these two decisions there are six options. Which of the sex do you like most? Put a 1 in the box next to that option. Now look at the other five: which of those is your 'next-best'choice? Put a 2 in the box nest to that one. Put a 3 against your third-best -and so on, down to 6 against the one that would be your least preferred of these six options.
If on of these questions is played out for real,we will pick two of the options at random and you will play out whichever one of the two you have ranked higher.
Decision 14
Please rank each of the six option below from 1 (most preferred) to 6 (least preferred) Type in your ranking into the box on the left. However, the second ranking task differed between 'treatment' variations, as shown in Table 4 . For the V1 subsample, the pairs of payoffs in each row were the same as in the first ranking task, but the Black:White probability ratio became 0.3:0.7 rather than 0.5:0.5, so that the EV rose much more slowly from top row to bottom row (increasing from £10.00 to £10.50 in increments of £0.10 rather than from £10.00 to £17.50 in increments of £1.50). The conventional wisdom here is that only those who are risk seeking or risk neutral (or at most just very slightly risk averse) will rank F higher than A, and the only people who should place B, C, D or E first are those with sufficient risk aversion to turn down F but not enough risk aversion to prefer A.
For the V2 subsample, the Black:White probability ratio was 0.7:0.3 and the payoffs in each row were different divisions of £20, from £10:£10 in the top row to £20:0 in the bottom row, with EVs increasing from £10.00 to £14.00 in increments of £0.80. As we shall see later, this latter table was intended to provide a direct comparison with one of the allocation tasks to be discussed in Section 3. But it is also the case that the relationship between the EVs and the variances of the bets is broadly comparable to that for DT14, so that, to the extent that measures of risk attitude reflect this relationship, we should expect to see those choosing A and B in DT14 being spread over A, B and C in DT15, with those choosing C and D in DT14 opting for D, E and F in DT15 and those picking E and F in DT14 being expected to opt for F in DT15.
Results for the Ranking Procedure
As with the choice list procedure, participants could scroll between both ranking procedure tasks and adjust their responses to either one in the light of their answers to the other. Again, this was intended to allow the opportunity for whatever kind of consistency the individual wished to achieve. Table 5 reports the numbers of individuals in the V1 subsample putting each option at the top of their ranking.
So the direction of movement is much as we should have expected, although of the 70 who chose the sure option in DT14, 12 moved away to a riskier position in DT15, despite those options offering much poorer gains in return for the extra risk. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient of 0.331 is significant at the 1% level but is arguably quite low (although the preponderance of A choices in both tasks -but especially in DT15 -might limit the sensitivity of the coefficient).
For the V2 subsample, the first choice data are shown in Table 6 below. Here too, the overall distribution of first choices moves in the expected direction. The Spearman rank correlation between DT14 and DT15 is 0.495, which is significant at the 1% level and higher than most of the correlations reported so far. However, when we look at individual behaviour, there were indications that both A and F may have been somewhat oversubscribed in DT14. The 77 who opted for A in DT14 (and therefore turned down the mean-variance trade-off in B or beyond) should not, on that basis, have opted for anything riskier than B in DT15; yet, 39 of them opted for C, and another 17 opted for D, E or F in roughly equal numbers. At the other end of the table, all 45 with sufficiently little aversion to risk that they top-ranked F in DT14 might also have been expected to select F in DT15. However, only 30 did so, with another 13 opting for A, B or C. This would be consistent with the possibility that imprecise preferences, in conjunction with procedures which start at one end or other of the table, may result in disproportionate numbers in those end categories. One noteworthy feature of the DT15 distribution in Table 6 is the mode at option C. It is possible that the popularity of that option in this task is due in part to factors that we shall see at play in the allocation procedure, which provided the first thirteen tasks in the experiment. We focus on that procedure next.
The Allocation Procedure
Design and Motivation
Our experimental examination of the allocation procedure was built on a design used in Loomes (1991) . Our respondents were given a fixed total sum of money (£20) and were invited to allocate it in any way they wished between different possible states of the world that are contingent upon the outcome of a well-defined random mechanism. In this case, the random mechanism was a bag of 10 coloured balls.
There were thirteen different distributions of up to three colours, as shown in Table 7 below, where each distribution constituted a different DT.
Each task was implemented via a computer display such as the one shown in Figure 3 below. In each case, participants indicated how much of the £20 they wished to allocate to each colour by moving the sliders, thereby setting the amounts at the right-hand end of each slider to the nearest £0.10. It was explained that if one of these questions was selected to be the basis for the individual's payment, the relevant mix of coloured balls would be put into an opaque bag. The respondent would then draw one ball at random from that bag and receive whatever sum of money he had allocated to that colour.
Participants moved from one DT to the next by scrolling down, and after making their thirteenth allocation, they were invited to scroll back up to earlier answers and adjust them if they wished, to give them every opportunity to reflect upon their decision strategies and give the responses that they were content to have as the basis for payment. Once participants were satisfied with all their responses to the allocation DTs, they confirmed them as a whole.
Table 7
Design of the Allocation Task How might a standard deterministic model of state-contingent claims expect participants to behave? If respondents' subjective values for the payoffs are functions only of the amounts on offer in the experiment, they will divide the £20, allocating X to Black, Y to White and Z to Yellow so that the marginal utilities of X, Y and Z are inversely proportional to the relative probabilities of success -i.e. in the example shown in Figure 3 , so as to achieve u′(Z) = 3u′(Y) = 6u′(X).
13 So those who are risk seeking, risk neutral or only slightly risk averse will set X = £20 and Y = Z = 0, producing an allocation with the highest available EV (here, £12). Those who are extremely risk averse will set X = Y = £6.70 and Z = £6.60, giving an EV of £6.69. Intermediate degrees of risk aversion result in allocations somewhere between the two, with lower EVs correlating with higher degrees of risk aversion. If we were to assume a particular functional form of EU such as CRRA, the 13 allocation decisions would allow us to estimate the risk attitude parameter which best organises a particular individual's responses.
14 Recently, researchers have used different variants of the general idea of asking respondents to make allocation decisions. For example, Choi et al. (2007) asked their participants to distribute their budget across two states of nature whose probabilities of occurrence were fixed (either at ⅓ : ⅔ or at ½ : ½) but where the relative costs of statecontingent claims were varied. They concluded that many participants in the 13 A standard formulation of EUT, where utility is a function of wealth, would suppose that an individual who comes to the experiment with existing wealth W would try to allocate the £20 between X, Y and Z so as to make the ratios of the marginal utilities of W + X, W + Y and W + Z equal to the inverse of the ratios of the probabilities of the different colours being drawn. However, much experimental evidence suggests that many respondents act as if they are not integrating payoffs with W but are focusing mainly or solely on gains or losses relative to their status quo level of wealth -see Rabin (2000) .
14 See online appendix D for the calculations of CRRA coefficients.
population could be divided into three main groups: extremely risk-averse types who always opt for a safe portfolio choice; participants whose behaviour is consistent with risk neutrality; and participants who do not fall within the first or the second option but whose decisions were approximately compatible with a simple proportionality heuristic. Not all participants fell cleanly into one or other category: some seemed to jump from one to another; others seemed to approximate one of the categories but with modifications. More recently, Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a) asked respondents to allocate tokens between different payoff dates, with earlier-paying tokens usually being worth less than later-dated tokens 15 and with the sizes of those differences and the lengths of time between payoff dates being varied. A proportionality heuristic was not so easily available in this task and about 70% of allocations were corner solutions, either allocating all 100 tokens to the earlier date or else having all 100 tokens pay out at the later date, with 24 of the 97 respondents allocating all 100 tokens to the later date on every single occasion when later-dated tokens paid more, however small the difference and whatever the time delay involved.
In a companion paper, Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b) compared cases where the time-dated payments were certain and cases where there was some probability less than 1 that they would be received: here certain payments seemed to be treated quite differently from risky payments, and although corner solutions still constituted more than a quarter of all observations in the risky scenarios, this was very different from the 80% of corner solutions in the certain scenarios in this experiment.
These results are incompatible with standard deterministic-core-plus-white-noise models but there is little discussion on the extent to which they might be artefacts of interactions between imprecise preferences and the allocation procedure. However, Cheung (2013) compared their allocation procedure with a choice list procedure: regarding the dichotomy between certain and uncertain payments, he states in his abstract that 'the effect disappears completely when a multiple price list instrument is used'.
Despite their possible susceptibility to rules of thumb as a way of coping with imprecise preferences, both Choi et al. (2007) and Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a,b) make strong claims for the usefulness and greater plausibility of the estimates derived from their allocation tasks. In a recent article, Charness and Gneezy (2012) have also advocated the use of an allocation procedure for measuring risk attitudes. Additional support for this kind of procedure comes from Hey and Pace (2011, p. 2) who assert that such tasks 'are more informative than pairwise choice questions and probably more reliable than reservation price questions and thus more able to detect true preferences'. However, with the exception of Cheung (2013), we are not aware of any systematic comparison that has been conducted between this procedure and other methods of eliciting risk attitudes, so an investigation of the properties of such a task should be of interest.
Results for the Allocation Procedure
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To give some initial picture of the way people responded to the allocation task, Table 8 shows the distributions of amounts allocated to Black for DT1, DT2, DT4 and DT6, the four simplest cases where there were only Black and White balls and where Prob (Black) > 0.5. The amounts allocated to Black are shown by the row labels and the columns show the numbers of individuals falling into each row for the four different DTs. As respondents had strong inclinations to give answers rounded to the nearest whole pound, every other row shows whole-pound responses, while the rows in between capture responses involving other multiples of £0.10.
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Going to the bottom row, we see that in DT1, 156 individuals allocated all £20 to Black. Reading along that bottom row shows that the numbers allocating all £20 to Black fall markedly as the probability of Black falls, leaving just 16 in this category for DT6. Of these, six displayed at least some degree of risk aversion in other DTs, leaving just 10 who allocated all £20 to the highest probability events in every DT. Thus, at most, there are 10 out of 351 participants who display behaviour consistent with risk neutrality or risk seeking as judged on the basis of this procedure.
For DT2, DT4 and DT6, the modal response involves dividing the £20 in exact proportion to the probabilities, while for DT1, this is the second most popular response. In fact, 55 (15.7%) of the 351 respondents divided the £20 in exact proportion to the probabilities in every one of the 13 allocation tasks; and 37.4% of all responses exhibited such proportionality. 18 One interpretation is that a substantial minority of respondents' utility functions are logarithmic (or approximately so) in gains. A rather different interpretation is that many respondents who have somewhat imprecise preferences are content to adopt a simple proportionality heuristic which has broadly appealing properties -it involves putting more money on higher probability events while not staking everything on just one -and which just happens to operate in the same way as logarithmic utility. If the first interpretation is correct, we should expect these individuals to exhibit behaviour consistent with a logarithmic utility function in the ranking and choice list tasks; if the second interpretation is closer to the mark, logarithmic utility will fail to predict behaviour in those other tasks where the same heuristic is not so readily available. We shall return to this issue in Section 4.
Those individuals exhibiting proportionality are a substantial minority but a minority nevertheless. To form some view about the extent to which the allocation task provides a measure of relative risk attitude across the sample as a whole while avoiding any specific functional form, we rank individuals within each DT according to the EVs of their chosen allocation. That is, we suppose that if individual G is more risk averse than individual H, G will prefer an allocation in each task, which entails a smaller spread of payoffs and a lower EV than the allocation selected by H. Table 9 shows the Spearman rank correlation between every pair of DTs (except DT9 where all EVs were necessarily the same). Although all of these correlation coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level, there is considerable variability, from 0.843 down to 0.187. As we found with the choice list tasks, the correlations tend to be highest between those tasks that are adjacent and/or with the most similar parameters, and tend to fall for pairs that are further apart and/or more different. If Notes. Most participants gave responses in whole pounds and these are shown in the rows labelled with integers. Those who gave responses in any multiple of £0.10 other than whole pounds are shown in the alternating rows. For example, in response to DT1, 96 participants stated exactly £18 and 16 participants stated exactly £19 while 7 participants stated amounts strictly between £18 and £19. we can only make rather limited inferences from one allocation task to another, how much more cautious should we be about inferences to other kinds of decision task? That is the question addressed in the next Section.
Comparisons Between Procedures
Previous Comparisons Within and Between Procedures
Several studies have compared elicited risk attitudes across procedures, with mixed results. Dave et al. (2010) compare Holt and Laury (2002) and Eckel and Grossman (2002) procedures and correlate obtained results with the measure of numerical skills. They conclude that EUT with CRRA fits the data from both tasks equally well in the subsample of participants with relatively low numerical skills, but for those with high numerical skills, EUT with CRRA fits the data better in the Holt and Laury (2002) task than in the Eckel and Grossman (2002) task. Harrison and Rutstrom (2008, p. 82) compare both methods with a third based on separate binary choices and derive CRRA estimates from all three. They note that the Holt and Laury (2002) procedure exhibits a statistically significant order effect but they 'tentatively conclude . . . that the procedures should be expected to generate roughly the same estimates of risk attitudes for a target population . . . when used at the beginning of a session'. By contrast, Deck et al. (2008) compare coefficients of CRRA across three tasks: Holt and Laury (2002), Eckel and Grossman (2002) and a task which represents a series of binary choices between a risky lottery and an amount of money for certain. They observe significant differences in the obtained coefficients between tasks and account for these inconsistencies using participants' personality traits. Our study extends the range of comparisons for the Eckel and Grossman (2002) and Holt and Laury (2002) procedures and allows further comparisons with the allocation procedure.
Choice List and Ranking Procedures
Up to this point, we have tried to avoid using any particular functional forms because any such usage is open to the objection that the selected form may be the wrong oneat least, for some, and perhaps many, members of a sample. On the other hand, the instruments discussed in previous sections often are used in conjunction with particular specifications.
19 So it may be of interest to consider an example in relation to the Holt and Laury (2002) and Eckel and Grossman (2002) tasks. Were we to assume CRRA, using a standard format whereby u(x) = x 1Àr /(1 À r) for r 6 ¼ 1 and u(x) = ln(x) for r = 1, we could use the median 20 estimate of r derived from people's responses to the five choice list tasks to predict their top-ranked options in the DT14 ranking task and then compare those predictions with the actual responses. Table 10 does that. For both subsamples, there are very clear differences between the actual distributions and those based on the choice list procedure. Most strikingly, the choice list tasks never produce a median r high enough to entail ranking the sure £10 option first and only seldom produce a median r greater than 1, whereas the majority of individuals behave in the ranking task as if their values of r are greater than 1.
So although there may be a significantly positive rank correlation between the two procedures -for example, the Spearman correlation coefficients for DT14 and DT20 are 0.392 for V1 and 0.463 for V2, both of which are significant at the 1% level -the degree of transferability of more precise parameter estimates may be very much more limited. Of course, we acknowledge that part of the reason for this could be that CRRA is not the appropriate specification for all individuals; but that only serves to underline the fact that the validity of any parameter estimates depends upon the adequacy of the particular assumption made about a functional form.
The Allocation and Choice List Procedures
In Section 3, we saw that dividing the £20 total in strict proportion to observed probabilities was a popular response, with 55 participants doing so in every one of the thirteen DTs. Even for those who sometimes divided the total in some other way, proportionality was often observed, and overall 150 participants' median response was strictly proportional.
If that median were reasonably diagnostic, we should expect these 150 to behave quite similarly to one another in the choice list decision tasks -that is, to be switching at much the same point as each other in each list. But that is not what we see: although they may be a little more tightly clustered than the rest of the sample in DT17 and DT19, the difference is slight. For the other three choice lists, there is no discernible difference: they are typically distributed across four or five switching points in much the same way as those for whom proportional allocation was not the median. The allocation procedure is at best a weak indicator of behaviour in the choice list tasks.
The Allocation and Ranking Procedures
In this case, we can make direct comparisons between two tasks -DT4 and V2's DT15 -which effectively asked the same question framed differently. In DT4, respondents were asked to divide £20 between Black and White when there were seven Black and three White balls. In the DT15 presented to V2, there were seven Black and three White balls and six discrete options offering different ways of dividing £20 between Black and White. In short, this version of DT15 is essentially the same as DT4 except that the options are restricted to the six involving payoffs which are multiples of £2.
If we were to assume that, when presented with DT15, each respondent would select the option closest to whatever answer he gave in DT4 (with those giving responses exactly halfway between options being assigned in equal numbers to both), we can again compare the distribution of actual responses to DT15 with the distribution inferred from DT4, as in Table 11 below.
It is clear that the actual pattern of responses was very different from the one that would be inferred from the allocation task, with the ranking task pulling towards the less risk-averse options E and F, while the allocation task pulled the distribution strongly towards the proportional division. Thus, nearly three times as many participants top-ranked E and F as would have been predicted from the allocation responses, while about 50% more participants were predicted to top-rank the £14:£6 option C than actually did so -and this, even after they had previously undertaken 13 allocation tasks that might have primed them towards proportionality. Such a difference would be compatible with the general proposition that people are imprecise about their preferences and thus are liable to process what is formally the same problem in rather different ways when the framing provides rather different procedural 'cues'. It is plainly incompatible with any 'deterministic-core-plus-whitenoise' model that would entail only random differences between the two distributions.
A similar story -indeed, arguably an even more striking story -comes from examining the behaviour of the 55 individuals who divided the £20 in all thirteen allocation tasks exactly in proportion to the probabilities. Such unerring consistency might seem to be a strong expression of precise preferences, in which case this subset of respondents might be expected to display high levels of consistency in the next DT they encountered -the ranking task DT14, which was common to both V1 and V2. If we took those individuals' preferences to be logarithmic in gains, there would be a precise prediction for DT14: the optimal option, were it to be available, would be (£17.50, 0.5; £7, 0.5).
In fact, the two closest options that were actually available on either side of that 'optimum' were (£15, 0.5; £8, 0.5) and (£20, 0.5; £6, 0.5). However, only 12 (21.8%) of the 55 individuals put one or other of those options first, while 39 (70.9%) of them chose one of the extreme options -either £10 for sure or (£35, 0.5; £0, 0.5). It might be that, far from the allocation task tapping into preferences with much greater precision, those who stuck most rigidly to a proportionality heuristic were, if anything, less confident about their preferences and were therefore more content to use a simple rule of thumb.
Concluding Remarks
It would be convenient if it were true that most people have an 'attitude to risk', which is expressed in a stable and consistent manner across multiple contexts and which is reasonably easy to measure by some simple task. If this were true, it would be highly desirable to include a couple of such tasks in experiments or surveys to be able to take account of risk attitude when analysing data and interpreting their significance. However, our results caution against supposing that the three procedures used in a number of recent studies can deliver the desired level of reliability and transferability. In arriving at our conclusions, we have for the most part tried to avoid assuming any particular functional forms but have relied instead on non-parametric measures that provide much more general tests. The picture emerging from our experiment may be summarised as follows: (i) Except in cases where individuals follow an available rule of thumb, most individuals' responses to different questions within a particular procedure exhibit a degree of variability which appears to increase as the structure and/ or parameters of the questions become more dissimilar. Thus, it may be unsafe to expect that just one or two questions of any kind can provide a reliable measure at the individual level. Moreover, the way in which variability between responses changes as questions become more dissimilar leads us to conjecture that even if one were arguing for a 'deterministic-core-plus-whitenoise' model within a procedure, an off-the-shelf standard error specification is unlikely to be adequate: at the very least, we should investigate the extent to which the noise is contextual and/or heteroscedastic (Buschena and Zilberman, 2000; Wilcox, 2011) . (ii) However, this will not suffice. Even when we hold constant the parameters and the type of task, significant differences in patterns of response can still be induced by something as seemingly innocuous as which way up a table is presented. This is consistent with decision-making having a potentially influential procedural component. (iii) The fact that some individuals display high degrees of consistency in a particular type of task does not necessarily mean either that they have highly articulated underlying preferences or that the task is particularly good at detecting preferences which will transfer to other contexts. In fact, the opposite might be the case: it may be that a number of people who are quite uncertain about their preferences may find it appealing to use a simple heuristic that 'solves' the problem for them. However, this may have little or no predictive power in other tasks where that heuristic is not so readily available.
The overall picture, then, is that most individuals exhibit a good deal of variability in their responses to questions intended to elicit their risk attitudes. There is some rank correlation between risk attitudes elicited by different questions, but the imprecision of most people's preferences may make them susceptible to considerable procedural effects.
How should we react to these findings? In the short run, one recommendation is that researchers who wish to take some account of and/or make some adjustment for risk attitude in their studies should take care to pick an elicitation procedure as similar as possible to the type of decision they are studying and, ideally, should use several different questions and/or at least two different procedures to check the sensitivity of the risk attitude parameter estimates they generate.
In the longer run, the challenge is to engage with the inherently stochastic nature of human decision-making and develop models of the processes which produce people's responses. Deterministic models may be analytically more tractable but they are not realistic; adding some more or less arbitrary random error term to a deterministic core will not make them so. If the variability in human judgment is a reflection of decisionmaking as a cognitive process, we need to try to gain a better understanding of how contextual or procedural factors interact with that process. Wishing such influences away and assuming that decision processes are reducible to one-size-fits-all sets of axioms has not produced and will not produce a descriptively adequate account of human behaviour under risk and uncertainty.
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